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IAC-06-E6.4.12
INFORMATION WARF ARE: THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF USING SATELLITES
AND JAMMING TECHNOLOGIES IN PROPAGANDA BATTLES

Mark J. Sundahl*
Cleveland State University, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law
United States
mark.sundahl@law. csuohio. edu
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the right of states to broadcast propaganda by satellite in
times of war. In exploring this issue, the author addresses the hypothetical question of
whether a state may use DBS technology to broadcast a commercial news program, such
as CNN, into an enemy state in wartime as part of a larger campaign to win the support of
the civilian population. The author begins by establishing that that the consent of a
receiving state is required prior to such broadcasts, whether in peacetime or in times of
war. This requirement of "prior consent" is the only restriction of the broadcasting of
such news programs since the programs do not rise to the level of illegal war propaganda
nor would such broadcasts be prohibited by the international law demanding that outer
space be used only for "peaceful purposes." This analysis concludes with the warning
that the inviolability of the "prior consent" doctrine may be threatened by the recent
adoption by the United States of a more relaxed theory of what measures may be taken
under the right of self-defense. Finally, the author takes up the related question regarding
the right of states to use jamming technologies to block illegal satellite transmissions.
I. INTRODUCTION

defensive war as part of a larger
campaign to win the support of the
civilian population or at least counteract
misinformation promulgated on the
ground. The scenario of broadcasting
commercial news programs was selected
for
this analysis because
such
programming constitutes a mild form of
propaganda, as opposed to the more
likely illegal forms of propaganda that

The fundamental question posed
in this paper is whether a country has the
right in times of war to use free-to-air
direct broadcasting satellite (DBS)
technology to broadcast commercial
news programming, such as CNN, into
an enemy state. A state may want to
undertake such broadcasts during a
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Use by States of Artificial Earth
Satellites for International Direct
Television Broadcasting (Resolution
37/92). 1 Paragraph 14 of Resolution
37/92 provides that "an international
direct television broadcasting satellite
service shall only be established after the
conditions set forth in Paragraph 13 ...
have been met."2 Paragraph 13, in turn,
requires a state intending to initiate DBS
broadcasting into another state to "notify
the proposed receiving State or States of
such intention and . . . promptly enter
into consultation with any of those
States which so requests." 3
The "prior consent" doctrine is
expressed even more clearly in Article
IX of the 1972 UNESCO Declaration of
Guiding Principles on the Use of
Satellite Broadcasting for the Free Flow
of Information, the Spread of Education
and Cultural Exchange which requires
states to "reach or promote prior
agreements concerning direct satellite
broadcasting to the population of
countries other than the country of origin
of the transmission. "4
In addition, the 1978 UNESCO
Declaration on Fundamental Principles
Concerning the Contribution of the Mass
Media to Strengthening Peace and
International Understanding to the
Promotion of Human Rights and to
Countering Racialism, Apartheid and
Incitement to War (Mass Media

incite sedition or racial hatred. The
legalities of broadcasting news programs
is less clear than in the case of more
extreme war propaganda, and therefore
raises more difficult and interesting
questions.
II. "PRIOR CONSENT" AND OTHER
RESTRICTIONS ON
BROADCASTING PROPAGANDA
The legality of DBS broadcasts
of commercial news programming
hinges on the applicability of certain
doctrines of international law including
the "prior consent" doctrine, the
prohibition of war propaganda, and the
requirement that outer space be used for
"peaceful purposes."
As explained
below, the right to broadcast commercial
news is in fact limited only by the "prior
consent" doctrine.
A. The "Prior Consent" Doctrine
The general rule governing
television broadcasting using DBS
technology is that the sending state must
receive the consent of any receiving state
before initiating transmission. This view
is based on the fundamental principle of
state sovereignty which has been broadly
interpreted as granting states the right to
control the flow of information across
their borders. Although this rule is not
recognized as settled law by all nations
or scholars, evidence in the forms of
international resolutions, declarations,
regulations, and state practice almost
certainly provides sufficient proof that
customary international law requires
prior consent.
The
primary
document
supporting the "prior consent" doctrine
is the United Nations General Assembly
Resolution on Principles Governing the

1 Resolution on Principles Governing the Use by
States of Artificial Earth Satellites for
International Direct Television Broadcasting,
G.A. Res. 37/92, U.N. Doc. A/37/646 (1982)
[hereinafter, Resolution 37/92).
2 Id. para. 14.
3 Id. para. 13 (emphases added).
4 UNESCO Declaration of Guiding Principles on
the Use of Satellite Broadcasting for the Free
Flow of Information, the Spread of Education
and Cultural Exchange, art. IX, U.N. Doc.
A/C.l/L. 605 (1972) (emphasis added).
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Declaration) rejects the unlimited "free
flow" approach by calling for a "wider
and more balanced dissemination of
information."5 This language has been
interpreted by some commentators as
permitting international prohibitions on
the broadcast of objectionable media.6
The regulations issued by the
International Telecommunications Union
(ITU) also embrace the "prior consent"
doctrine by requiring states to "reduce,
to the maximum extent practicable, the
radiation over the territory of other
countries unless an agreement has been
with
such
previously
reached
countries."7
In addition to this
requirement for prior consent, the ITU
regulations require that states be capable
of immediately ceasing their broadcasts
into other states if such states object to
the transmission.s
The alternative to the "prior
consent" approach is the "free flow"
doctrine which asserts that a sending
state need not acquire the consent of a
receiving nation prior to broadcasting
into that state. Proponents of the "free
flow" doctrine point to certain
documents which, they claim, indicate
an inviolable right of peoples to send

and receive information, whether by
satellite broadcasts or other means.
Proponents of the "free flow" doctrine
rely primarily on Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
which provides that all people have the
right "to seek, receive, and impart
information and ideas through any media
and regardless offrontiers." 9 Article 19
of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) contains
virtually identical language asserting the
right of all people to send and receive
information across borders. 10
Although the language of the
Declaration of Human Rights and the
ICCPR celebrating the fundamental right
to information appears to give strong
support to the "free flow" theory, the
doctrine of "prior consent" wins out for
two reasons.
First, although a reading of the
above-mentioned documents may leave
some ambiguity with respect to whether
"prior consent" or "free flow" is the
governing law, this ambiguity is
resolved when state practice is taken into
The recognition of a
account. 11
9 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art.

19, U.N. G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. Doc. A/81 l
(1948)
(emphasis
added).
See also
Recommendation 2 of the International
Telecommunications Union which recommends
that "Members of the Union facilitate the
unrestricted
transmission
of
news
by
telecommunication services." Recommendation
2 of the International Telecommunications
Union, Unrestricted Transmission of News and
the Right to Communicate ( 1994), available at
http://www.itu.int/aboutitu/basic-texts/recommen
dations/recom02.html.
IO International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 19(2), G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976)
[hereinafter, ICCPR].
11 Ambiguities are also present within the
individual documents themselves. For example,
the preamble to Resolution 37/92 invokes "the

5

UNESCO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles Concerning the Contribution of the
Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and
International Understanding to the Promotion of
Human Rights and to Countering Racialism,
Apartheid and Incitement to War, art. IX,
UNESCO Gen. Conf. Res. 4/9.3/2, 20th Sess.
(1978), reprinted in ANN. REV. U.N. AFF. 238
40 [hereinafter, Mass Media Declaration].
6 See, e.g., Joel R. Paul, Images from Abroad:

Making Direct Broadcasting by Satellites Safe
for Sovereignty, 9 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
R. 329, 340 (l 986).
7 Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio
Conference for Space Telecommunications, ITU,
Radio Regulations No. 2674 (1971), 23 U.S.T.
1527, T.l.A.S. No. 7435 (1971).
8 Id. No. 470V.
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customary international law requires
evidence of the widespread and uniform
practice of nations that engage in such
practices out of a sense of legal
obligation, or opinio iuris. 12 Although
treaties, resolutions, and declarations are
good source of evidence regarding
customary international law, state
practice can provide equally valid
evidence. 13 And with respect to the
issue of trans-border DBS broadcasting,
state practice provides undeniable
evidence that customary international
law requires "prior consent." Virtually
every country (and certainly all
developed countries) regulate satellite
transmissions into their country by way
of rigorous licensing regimes. 14 Even
the United States, which has been the
strongest proponent of the "free flow"
doctrine, regulates satellite transmissions
through a rigorous licensing process
administered
by
the
Federal

Communications Commission. is When
divining
a
rule
of
customary
international law, the opinio iuris of
states carries great weight, and is most
clearly expressed by a state's practices.
The opinio iuris of the United States is
undoubtedly that the "prior consent"
doctrine governs DBS transmission.
Otherwise, why would the United States
adopt this approach in its domestic law
in the form of license requirements?
Once the weight of the United States is
thrown behind the "prior consent"
doctrine, there is little room left for
arguing the "free flow" doctrine.
Second, application of the lex
specialis rule of treaty interpretation
demands that the more specific
international law requmng "prior
consent"
for
DBS
television
broadcasting trumps the more general
rule permitting the "free flow" of
information across borders. The lex
specialis maxim states that "special
provisions are ordinarily more effective
than those that are general." 16 Under the
rule of lex specialis, since the "prior
consent" doctrine is a more specific rule
that applies exclusively to satellite
broadcasting, it should override the

right of everyone to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas" which appears to support
the "free flow" doctrine, despite the fact that the
resolution takes a "prior consent" approach in its
Article 19. Resolution 37/92, supra note l,
preamble.
For a discussion of internal
ambiguities contained in the Mass Media
Declaration see Paul, supra note 5, at 359.
12 See Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A
Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (1999) (with citations).
13 Evidence of customary international law can
be found in treaties, international court decisions,
domestic court decisions, domestic legislation,
state action, and scholarship.
See Mariana
Mello, Hagan v. Australia: A Sign of the
Emerging Notion of Hate Speech in Customary
International Law, 28 LOY. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 365, 368 (2006).
14 See Paul, supra note 6, at 347 ("Even a
cursory review of actual country practice . . .
would indicate that countries do not in fact
recognize an asserted right to impart and receive
information across national borders.")

15 For a detailed discussion of United States
opposition to the "prior consent" doctrine (in
contrast to its state practice) see DAYID I.
FISHER, PRIOR CONSENT TO INTERNATIONAL
DIRECT SATELLITE BROADCASTING 139
(1990).
16 See, e.g., Robert Howse & Petros C.
Mavroidis, Europe's Evolving Regulatory
Strategy for GMOS - The Issue of Consistency
With WTO Law: Of Kine and Brine, 24
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 317, 322 (2000) (quoting
Grotius). Although the principle of lex specialis
was not codified in the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, it is widely recognized as a
customary
international
law
of
treaty
interpretation. See IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 96
(1984).
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general pronouncements regarding the
more generalized right to the "free flow"
of information.
For the foregoing reasons,
international law is likely to require the
consent of a receiving state before a
sending state can transmit DBS
television signals.
Of course, under
Article 28 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, this
customary international law, once
established, binds all nations.17
B. The Prohibition of War Propaganda

In addition to the requirement of
"prior consent," DBS broadcastings
could, depending on the content of the
transmission, violate the international
law prohibiting certain types of
propaganda.
There
is
no
international
agreement on a definition of propaganda.
The most liberal approach defines
propaganda as any "systematic attempt
through
mass
communication
to
18
influence thinking and behavior." This
definition of propaganda would capture
even a fact-based news program, such as
CNN, provided that it was broadcasted
with the intent "to influence thinking and
behavior." A more restrictive approach,
as adopted by reference in the preamble
of the Outer Space Treaty, is found in
17

Statute of the International Court of Justice,
art. 38, 59 Stat. 1055 (1945). See also, e.g.,
Jordan J. Paust, The Importance of Customary
International Law During Armed Conflict, 12
ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 601, 602 (2006)
(explaining that "when a customary norm comes
into existence it is universally applicable.")
18 LESLIE JOHN MARTIN, INTERNATIONAL
PROPAGANDA: ITS LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC
CONTROL 12 (1958); see also Stephen T. Bayer,
The Legal Aspects of TV Marti in Relation to the
Law of Direct Broadcasting Satellites, 41
EMORY L.J. 541, 550 (1992).

United Nations General Assembly
Resolution 110 (II) which condemns "all
forms of propaganda, in whatsoever
country conducted, which is either
designed or likely to provoke or
encourage any threat to the peace,
breach of the peace, or act of
aggression." 19
Only the latter, hostile type of
propaganda is prohibited by international
law. This prohibition arises under treaty
law as well as international customary
law.
The 1936 League of Nations
Convention Concerning the Use of
Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace
prohibits transmissions that "constitute
an incitement either to war ... or to acts
likely to lead thereto." 20
Likewise,
Article 20 of ICCPR prohibits "any
propaganda for war." 21 Both documents
contemplate
the
inflammatory
propaganda that actively provokes war.
The ICCPR, in particular, should be
interpreted narrowly in light of its
original purpose, namely, to prohibit the
fascist war propaganda machine used by
the Third Reich to promote German wars
of aggression. 22 In addition to these
explicit treaty prohibitions, it is widely
recognized that customary international

United Nations General Assembly Resolution
110(11)), 1947-48 U.N.Y.B. 93 (1947). The
U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer
Space
(UNCOPUOS) has also defined
propaganda as a hostile act intended to provoke
war, incite sedition, interfere with the receiving
state's internal affairs, slander the receiving
state, or violate human rights. See U.N. GAOR
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
25th Sess., at 7, U.N. Doc. A/ AC.105179 (1970).
20 International Convention Concerning the Use
of Broadcasting in the Cause of Peace, art. 2,
Sept. 23, 1936, 186 L.N.T.S. 301.
21 ICCPR, supra note 10, art. 20.
22 See CENTRAL EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN
LAW
INITIATIVE,
ICCPR
LEGAL
IMPLEMENTATION INDEX 140 (2003)
19
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law prohibits war propaganda as well.23
It can certainly be said that no country
objects to such a prohibition. 24
Since news programs such as
CNN do not actively incite war, the DBS
transmission of commercial news
programs should not be affected by the
prohibition against war propaganda.

which states that "[t]he Moon and other
celestial bodies shall be used by all
States Parties to the Treaty exclusively
for peaceful purposes. " 27 A plain reading
of this provision suggests that the
"peaceful purpose" requirement applies
only to use of the Moon and celestial
bodies - but does not apply to other
regions of outer space, thus allowing for
the militarization of the Earth orbits
(with the exception of on-orbit weapons
of mass destruction).28
An alternative interpretation of
the Outer Space Treaty relies on a more
expansive reading of the treaty and holds
that the "peaceful purpose" doctrine
applies to all of outer space, including
Earth orbits. This interpretation relies
both on customary international law as
reflected in the practice of states (which
is incorporated into the Outer Space
Treaty via Article III which states that
the use of outer space shall be carried
out "in accordance with international
law") and on the language of the
preamble to the Outer Space Treaty
which emphasizes the "use of outer
space for peaceful purposes" in two
places.29 Commentators generally agree
that customary international law requires
that all of outer space, including earth
orbits, be used only for "peaceful
purposes. "30

C. The "Peaceful Purposes" Doctrine

Direct satellite broadcasts in time
of war may also be affected by the
restrictions on the military use of space
contained in the Treaty on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space,
Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) - which is
often referred to as the Magna Carta of
space law. 25 There are two ways to
interpret the Outer Space Treaty with
respect to the militarization of Earth
orbits. One possible interpretation is
that the military use of earth's orbit is
permitted - with the sole limitation that
no nation may place into orbit "any
objects carrying nuclear weapons or any
other kinds of weapons of mass
destruction." 26 This interpretation is
founded on a plain language reading of
Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty
23 See Elizabeth A. Downey, A Historical Survey
of the International Regulation of Propaganda,

21 Jd.

in
MICHIGAN
YEARBOOK
OF
INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL
STUDIES:
OF
TRANSNATIONAL
REGULATION
COMMUNICATIONS 341 (1984); see also Bayer,
supra note I8, at 549.
24 Jd.

28 See GENNADY ZHUKOV & YURI KOLOSOV,
INTERNATIONAL SPACE LAW 53 (1984)
(arguing that the Outer Space Treaty requires
"total neutralization and demilitarization of
celestial
bodies
and
[only]
partial
demilitarization of outer space"); Michel
Bourbonniere, National-Security Law in Outer

25 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer
Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205
(entered into force Oct. IO, 1967) [hereinafter,
Outer Space Treaty].
26 Id. art. IV.

Space: The Interface of Exploration and
Security, 70 J. AIR L. & COM. 3, 16 (2005)
29 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 25, preamble.
30 See, e.g., Bourbonniere, supra note 28, at 16;
Richard A. Morgan, Military Use of Commercial
Communication Satellites: A New Look at the
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How
does
this
"peaceful
purposes" requirement affect the use of
communications satellites in time of
war? Before we answer this, further
analysis should be given to the meaning
of the phrase "peaceful purposes."
There are three basic approaches to the
interpretation of the "peaceful purposes"
doctrine. Under the first approach, some
commentators argue for the absolute
demilitarization of outer space.3 1
Pursuant to the second approach, the
word "peaceful" is treated as equivalent
to "non-aggressive,'' thus allowing the
military to use communications satellites
for non-tactical support of military
operations, such as for communications,
navigation, and weather monitoring. 32
The third approach also adopts the "non
aggressi ve" definition of "peaceful," but
applies a broader interpretation which
allows for the use of space assets,
including satellites, for any action taken

Outer Space Treaty and "Peaceful Purposes",
60 J. AIR L. & COM. 237, 242 (1994)
(explaining that "[s]upport for the conclusion
that current international law requires all of outer
space to be used for "peaceful purposes" is
compelling.").
31
See, e.g., Ricky Lee, Reconciling
International Space Law with the Commercial
Realities of the Twenty-First Century, 4 SING. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 194, 214 (2000) ("[T]he
United States would ... not to undertake a new
obligation involving the full demilitarisation of
space. This interpretation is contrary to existing
interpretations that are found in international
law.")
32 See, e.g., Robert L. Bridge, International Law
and Military Activities In Outer Space, 13
AKRON L. REV. 649, 658 (1979).
This
interpretation of the "peaceful purposes" doctrine
relies heavily on the language of the UN Charter
which states as its overarching goal
"international peace and security," but at the
time allows for military action to "suppress acts
of aggression." Charter of the United Nations,
art. 1, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 (1945)
[hereinafter, UN Charter].

in accordance with the UN Charter, thus
allowing full military use of space for
purpose of self-defense or as ordered by
the UN Security Council.33
Only under the first approach to
the "peaceful purposes" doctrine might a
state's DBS broadcasting of commercial
news be restricted since this strict
interpretation may be taken so far as to
prohibit any use of space assets by the
military, even if such use occurs in
peacetime and is not related to a military
strike.34 However, this would require
the broadcast to be characterized as a
military operation, which may not be
easily determined. Moreover, since this
strict interpretation requiring the total
demilitarization of space does not find
wide support, it is unlikely to create a
bar to DBS broadcasting of a news
program. Under the second approach,
the use of satellites to broadcast news,
even if part of a broader campaign to
achieve a military victory, is likely to be
deemed permissible since it is more akin
to a non-tactical support activity in light
of the fact that it bears no relation to a
military strike. Finally, under the third
approach DBS news broadcasts would
be permissible even if deemed to be part
of a tactical military operation, provided
that the broadcast was part of a military
33 This third approach reflects the principle
stated in Resolution 3314 of the UN General
Assembly which provides that "[a]ggression is
the use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of another State, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the
United Nations."
United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 3314 (XXIX): Definition
of Aggression, art. I, G.A. Res. 3314, U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974). For a recent detailed
discussion of various approaches to the "peaceful
purposes" doctrine see Morgan, supra note 30.
34 See, e.g., Lee, supra note 31, at 215.
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campaign that was justified under the
UN Charter.

states that "(n]othing in the present
Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an
armed
attack
occurs. "36
Under
customary international law, the right of
self-defense permits a state to respond to
an armed attack with "measures which
are proportional to the armed attack and
necessary to respond to it."37 Therefore,
a state would only be able to bypass the
"prior
consent"
requirement
if
broadcasting into the enemy state was
"necessary" for its defense. It is unlikely
that a state could successfully make this
argument in the context of the classical
theory of self-defense which assumes
that actions taken in self-defense are
necessary in order to respond to an
immediate threat. The broadcasting of a
news program would not provide much
protection against an immediate military
threat. However, some nations have
adopted a more liberal view which
allows for anticipatory self-defense in
the face of an imminent threat.3 8
Moreover, in response to the growing
threat of terrorism, the United States has
further relaxed its understanding of the
doctrine of self-defense to allow for
military action to guard against a
"continuing threat" even when no strike
is known to be imminent. 39 It is under
this "continuing threat" theory of self
defense that the "prior consent"
requirement could, arguably, be set aside
if DBS broadcasting of commercial
news programs were deemed to be a
necessary measure for the nullification

D. Preliminary Conclusion: The "Prior
Consent" Doctrine is the Only
Restriction on the DBS Broadcasting
of Commercial News Programs
In light of the foregoing, the
DBS transmission of news programs
should not be banned by either the
prohibition against war propaganda or
the "peaceful purposes" doctrine.
Therefore, the "prior consent" doctrine is
the only restriction on broadcasting
commercial news programs, such as
CNN, into an enemy state in time of war.
This brings us to the final question
addressed in this paper, namely, whether
the right to self-defense can excuse a
state from having to comply with the
"prior consent" requirement in times of
war.
III. "PRIOR CONSENT" IN TIMES OF
WAR
Having established that the "prior
consent" requirement applies to DBS
satellite broadcasts of commercial news
under our hypothetical scenario, the final
question now presents itself: can a state
invoke the right of self-defense as a basis
for refusing to comply with the "prior
consent" doctrine in times of war? 35
The right of a state to act in self
defense is based on customary
international law and is recognized in
Article 51 of the UN Charter which

UN Charter, supra note 32, art. 51.
Nicaragua v. United States of America, 1986
I.CJ. 14 (emphasis added).
38 See, e.g., Howard A. Wachtel, Targeting
Osama Bin Laden: Examining the Legality of
Assassination as a Tool of U.S. Foreign Policy,
55 DUKE L.J. 677, 691-92 (2005).
39 Jd.
36

35 It is assumed for purposes of the present

37

discussion that the international law prohibiting
broadcast without prior consent would continue
in times of war. For further discussion regarding
this issue see LaToya Tate, The Status of the
Outer Space Treaty at International Law During
"War" and "Those Measures Short ofWar", 32 J.
SPACE L. 177 (2006)
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of a continuing terrorist threat. This
argument of necessity could conceivably
be based on the idea that force alone
cannot defeat terrorism, but must be
coupled with the free flow of
information
that
can
counteract
misinformation and dispel the cultural
misunderstandings that foster extremism.

the general proclamations of the right to
exchange information are trumped,
under the rule of lex specialis, by more
specific expressions of international law
which have permitted states to maintain
sovereign
control
over
media
transmissions. Such commentators have
looked primarily to Article 19(2) of the
International
Telecommunications
Convention (ITC) which allowed states
to stop transmissions that endanger the
"security of the State or are contrary to
their laws, to public order or to
decency."41 Similarly, Article 20 of the
ITC provided that a state may suspend
"international
telecommunications
service" for an indefinite time (provided
that the Secretary-General is notified).42
However, the ITC has since been
supplanted by the Constitution of the
International Telecommunications Union
(the "ITU Constitution") and the
of
the
International
Convention
Telecommunications Union, which can
be said to take a more liberal approach to
the "free flow" of information.43
Even without a strong argument
on the basis of lex specialis, state
practice
supports
a
customary
international law allowing the jamming
of unwanted signals. Although the
majority of examples of state practice of
signal jamming involve totalitarian states
such as Soviet Russia, Cuba, Libya and
Iran, there are also examples of western
democracies engaging in jamming, at

IV. THE RIGHT TO JAM ILLEGAL
SATELLITE TRANSMISSIONS
The question regarding the right
of a state to broadcast satellite television
is only part of a greater debate. The
complementary issue is whether, and to
what extent, a state has the right to jam
satellite television transmissions.
As was true regarding the right to
broadcast, there are two main schools of
thought regarding jamming. Some argue
that jamming violates the fundamental
right of people to impart and receive
information under Article 19 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and Article 19 of the ICCPR, both of
which provide that all people have a
fundamental right "to seek, receive, and
impart information and ideas."40 Others
have argued that the right to jam
unwanted signals goes hand-in-hand
with a state's right to regulate the flow
of telecommunications into its territory.
It is argued that this right to use jamming
technology is a necessary tool to assert
state sovereignty and is complementary
to the doctrine of "prior consent." Just
as a state should not be subjected to
media transmissions without its consent,
so should a state have a right to jam a
signal for which it has not given the
required consent.
In support of the legality of
jamming, proponents have argued that

41 International Telecommunications Convention,
art. 19(2), 32 U.S.T. 3821 [hereinafter ITC].
42 Id. art. 20.
43
Constitution
of
the
International
Telecommunications
Union,
available
at
http://www.itu.int/aboutitu/basic-texts/
constitution.html [hereinafter ITU Constitution];
of
the
International
Convention
Telecommunication Union, available at http://
www.ito.int/aboutitu/basic-texts/convention.html
[hereinafter ITU Convention].

40

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra
note 9, art. 19; ICCPR, supra note IO, art. 19.
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least in times of war. 44 Moreover, the
practices of western states once again
confirm that jamming is permissible as a
customary international law in light of
the pervasive licensing regimes that
western
countries
administer.
Unlicensed satellite broadcasts are not
tolerated in any industrialized country.
Therefore, it would be difficult to make
the argument that such states do not
support, at least to some extent, the
principle that states have sovereign
control over their media transmission in
their territory.45
Pursuant to the foregoing, states
likely have the right under international
law to jam illegal transmissions. This

right applies to the jamming of war
propaganda without question, but it is
also likely to apply to the jamming of
any transmission made without the
receiving state's consent.
However,
there are certainly limits to what form
the jamming can take. If the purpose of
the jamming is merely to enforce the
doctrine of "prior consent" or block the
transmission of war propaganda, then the
jamming should be limited to what is
necessary to jam the objectionable
signals. Causing greater interference
than necessary would likely violate
Article 45 of the ITU Constitution which
prohibits states from causing "harmful
interference" to the telecommunications
of other states. 46 Similarly, the jamming
would likely be subject to the
proportionality requirement applicable to
actions taken in self-defense (although
application of the proportionality
requirement in the absence of an armed
or imminent attack is uncertain).
Therefore, the jamming should be of no
greater magnitude than necessary to
obstruct the
illegal
transmission.
Disproportional jamming can cause
harm to innocent third parties who use
neighboring transponders, as was the
case when U.S. commercial radio
broadcasters suffered revenue loss due to
interference caused by Cuban jamming
of Radio Marti.47

44 See David Hencke & Owen Gibson, Protest to

Libya after Satellites Jammed, THE GUARDIAN,
Dec.
3,
2005,
available
at
http:llwww.guardian.co.ukllibya/story/0,,165691
4,00.html (regarding Libya's jamming of two
commercial satellites); Tom Carter, Castro
Regime Jamming U.S. Broadcasts into Iran, THE
WASHINGTON TIMES, July 16, 2003, available
at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/functionsl
print.php?StorylD=20030715-114937-2635r
(regarding Cuba's jamming of Telstar-12
transmission of Voice of America broadcasts in
Farsi into Iran); Bayer, supra note 18, at 572
(describing how Cuba jammed TV Marti 
broadcasted from an aerostat - within minutes of
its launch in 1990); see also Adeno Addis, The
Thin State in Thick Globalism: Sovereignty in
the Information Age, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. l, 30 (2004). The significance of jamming by
Cuba and other countries with respect ~to the
formation of customary international law may be
weakened if it is shown that such practices are
conducted in secret, which would indicate that
such practices do not reflect the country's opinio
iuris.
45 For further discussion regarding territorial
sovereignty and media broadcasts see
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 529
(1955). One question that presents itself here is
whether an intermediate rule of customary
international law can be formulated which only
permits regulation of media transmissions in
accordance with reasonable rules that are
politically neutral.

V. CONCLUSION
Both treaty law and customary
international law require that a sending
46 ITU Constitution, supra note 43, art. 45.
47

See Bayer, supra note 18, at 570-71 & n. 191.
The commercial broadcasters were compensated
by the U.S. government pursuant to the Radio
Broadcast to Cuba Act. See Compensation of
Expenses to Mitigate Cuban AM Interference
Cuban Interference, 97 F.C.C.2d 181 (1984).
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2. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A
Theory ofCustomary International Law, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1113 (1999)

state acquire the consent of a receiving
state before using DBS broadcasting to
transmit television programs, such as
commercial news programs. The "prior
consent" requirement is the only
restriction under international law that is
applicable to the broadcasting of such
news programs since the programs do
not rise to the level of illegal war
propaganda nor would such broadcasts
be prohibited by the international law
demanding that outer space be used only
for "peaceful purposes." Not restricted
to peacetime, this requirement of "prior
consent" continues in times of war. The
only law of war that could threaten the
integrity of the "prior consent" doctrine
is a state's fundamental right to self
defense. However, it is unlikely that the
right to self-defense could be invoked as
an excuse for failing to comply with the
"prior consent" requirement since the
broadcasting of news media could never
be necessary for self-defense against an
immediate
threat.
However,
the
inviolability of the "prior consent"
doctrine may be threatened by the recent
adoption by the United States of a more
relaxed theory of self-defense.
Finally, in the event that a state
does broadcast into another state without
first securing prior consent, the receiving
state has the right to jam such
broadcasts, with the sole proviso that
any such jamming must be proportional
so as to minimize unnecessary
interference that might cause harm to
innocent parties.
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